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Mushtaq Khan 
 
(in J. Harriss, J. Hunter and C. Lewis: The New Institutional Economics and 
Third World Development. Routledge, London 1995 pp. 71-86.) 
 
This chapter examines the implications of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
for analyzing state failure in developing countries. The NIE approach aims to 
identify the institutional causes of state failure. In their chapters Bates and Toye 
have argued that the economic consequences of particular institutions depend 
on the social and political context in which they are placed. The question is 
whether the results of the NIE analysis can be grafted on to data about political 
differences across countries or whether recognizing political differences requires 
abandoning the NIE approach.  
 
It will be argued that the performance ranking of institutions is specific to the 
inherited political power of classes or groups subject to the institution. By 
ignoring this, NIE authors have come up with competing rankings. Explaining 
institutional performance requires an analysis of the implications of the inherited 
balance of power or ‘political settlement’. Responding to institutional failures 
requires not just an understanding of the balance of power but also requires us to 
take political positions. This is not only because there are a multiplicity of 
potential improvements with different class and group implications. It is also 
because all solutions to institutional failure involve ‘political costs’ or ‘transition 
costs’. It is necessary to be explicit about these costs and recognize that their 
incidence is not equal or inevitable. In attempting to sanitize the analysis of state 
failure by removing political judgements and political positions, NIE may have 
clouded rather than clarified this issue.  
 
The first section defines institutions and state failure and distinguishes between 
two types of state failure which have been addressed within the NIE approach. 
The second and third sections discuss the two types of state failure and examine 
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the NIE approach to each type of failure. The final section draws some 
conclusions. 
 
TWO VARIANTS OF STATE FAILURE 
An institution is defined as the set of formal and informal rules which constrain 
and govern the interaction of agents subject to that institution (Schotter 1981: 11, 
North 1990: 3 and Knight 1992: 2). The formal institutional structure includes 
conventional property rights but also any other enforceable constraints such as 
taxes and subsidies. State regulation in general creates or attenuates property 
rights and is therefore part of the formal institutional structure. The state is also 
the body responsible for the enforcement and protection of all formal property 
rights. Both formal institutions and informal or voluntary ones affect economic 
outcomes because they condition the opportunities and incentives of agents. 
Institutional failure refers to some judgement about the potential improvement in 
performance if institutions could be restructured.  
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with formal institutions. The state is closely 
associated with the protection and maintenance of formal institutions and the 
processes through which they are changed. This is reflected in the close 
relationship between the literature on state (or government) failure and 
institutional failure. In the following analysis, the terms state failure and 
institutional failure are interchangeably used to describe the economic 
performance of formal institutions. State failure is therefore a descriptive term 
involving only a judgement about the potential benefits of alternative institutions. It 
does not necessarily imply that the state decides which institutions to protect and 
how. The state or parts of it can under some circumstances act autonomously, in 
others it simply responds to pressures from competing classes and groups. 
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Figure 5.1 Type I and Type II State Failure 
 
Two types of institutional and state failure can be distinguished in the NIE 
contributions. The distinction is between the performance of the existing set of 
institutions and the efficiency of the process through which institutions are 
changed. Type I state failure in Figure 5.1 refers to a comparison of the outcome 
generated by the existing structure of constraints on economic agents with the 
outcome generated by a hypothetical alternative structure of constraints. Thus 
Type I failure is referred to as structural failure. Outcomes may be compared in 
terms of a chosen criterion such as utility, net output or growth. The most general 
objective is to maximize the level of net benefits for society. Type I state failure 
or structural failure occurs if a particular formal institutional structure results in 
lower net benefits for society compared to an alternative structure. The lost net 
benefit indicates the magnitude of Type I failure. The better set of institutions 
could be theoretically identified or empirically observed. NIE uses transaction 
cost and rent-seeking analysis to compare net benefits under alternative sets of 
institutions to analyze the possibility and magnitude of Type I failure. 
 
Type II failures refer to failures in the process through which institutions change 
relative to alternative processes. Type II failures are therefore failures of 
transition. If Type I failure exists we want to compare alternative paths to a better 
structure. The existing process may be less satisfactory than an alternative 
specified by theory or observation and indeed the existing process of change 
may be increasing the magnitude of Type I failure. If an alternative process could 
have carried out a transition to a better structure or carried it out faster, the 
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cumulative difference in net benefits over a period of time gives a measure of 
Type II failure. Type II state failure or transition failure occurs when the process 
for changing the structure of institutions attains a lower cumulative set of net 
benefits for society compared to an alternative process over a given period. 
For Type II failure, NIE relies on ‘higher level’ transaction costs such as Douglass 
North's political transaction costs (North 1990) or the costs of organizing 
collective action to analyze the institutional determinants of processes of change.  
 
TYPE I STATE FAILURES 
The NIE analysis of Type I or structural failure draws on the analysis of rent-
seeking and extends it using an analysis of transaction costs. It aims to analyze 
the contribution of different institutions to economic performance. This 
understanding aims to aid the identification of the institutions responsible for 
structural failure across countries. This section examines the consequences of 
the NIE attempt. Different NIE analysts have identified very different institutions 
as being critical for success or failure. We argue that these contrary rankings can 
be explained by making explicit the political balances of power required to make 
different institutions work efficiently.  
 
Rent-seeking models (Krueger 1974, Posner 1975, Buchanan 1980, Bhagwati 
1982) emerged in trade theory and the New Political Economy (which is critically 
reviewed in Toye 1993). Proponents of such models argued that the cost of state 
intervention was more than the traditional deadweight welfare losses associated 
with the divergence of prices from marginal costs. This is because state-created 
rents create incentives for agents to leave productive activities for so-called 
unproductive ones to try and acquire credentials which give access to the rents. 
The withdrawal of resources from productive uses continues till the expected 
marginal return to a factor from productive and unproductive activities is 
equalized. The cost of rent-seeking is the use of productive resources in 
unproductive activities. Type I state failure is associated here with state 
intervention. Moves towards laissez faire are predicted to reduce the incidence 
of rent-seeking and hence Type I failure. 
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Transaction cost analysis derived from the seminal work of Coase (1937). 
Transaction costs are the costs of agreeing on a contract (including measuring 
all the attributes relevant for the exchange) and the costs of enforcing the contract 
(including the costs of detecting infringement, policing and punishing) (Matthews 
1986: 906, North 1990: 27, Eggertsson 1990: 14). Coase's insight that 
transaction costs differ across institutions underlies the NIE analysis of Type I 
failure. Type I failure is attributed to high transaction cost institutions.  
 
Transaction costs are detrimental for social net benefits because they prevent 
gainful transactions from occurring which might otherwise have taken place. The 
failure to exhaust gainful transactions is, of course, market failure. Consequently, 
transaction costs are simply a way of describing the causes of market failure. If 
finding the best technologies, organizing the process of production, finding 
markets, arranging insurance and writing credible and fully enforceable contracts 
for all of these were costless, every society would be on the notional production 
frontier. Since all such costs must be transaction costs, the gap between the 
neoclassical production function and reality can always and tautologically be 
attributed to transaction costs. To proceed beyond the conventional analysis, the 
transaction cost approach has to identify an attainable set of alternative 
institutions with lower transaction costs.  
 
How are these institutions identified by NIE? In what respects does the 
transaction cost approach extend the rent-seeking framework? Varian (1989) 
showed that if rent-seeking only resulted in pure transfers there would be no 
social cost in the conventional sense. The social cost derives from the effects of 
rent-seeking on the vector of net products. If rent-seeking results in a lower-
valued vector of net products with unchanged endowments this is equivalent to 
production inside the production frontier. This in turn can be described as an 
increase in the transaction cost of organizing production and exchange. Thus 
rent-seeking results in Type I failure by increasing transaction costs. Since rent-
seeking is only one of the sources of transaction costs, the transaction cost 
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framework can be used to show why the rent-seeking argument may be one-
sided in its simple versions.  
 
First, all property rights confer privileges on their possessors. Compared to the 
alternative where an individual did not have a particular right, these privileges 
have the character of rents (Roemer 1982, 1988). Rent-seeking type activities 
can, therefore, be expected to be associated with any structure of rights as 
people would spend resources trying to change or maintain them (Samuels and 
Mercuro 1984). Compared to a situation where such contests did not take place, 
any right structure has rent-seeking costs due to contestation. Type I failure 
however, only exists if lower rent-seeking costs are attainable. Comparing the 
real world with a contest-free laissez faire which is unattainable is irrelevant. The 
relevant transaction cost difference between intervention and non-intervention 
may be much smaller than suggested by rent-seeking theory. 
 
Second, intervention can save transaction costs by changing incentives or 
enabling coordination and monitoring. What matters therefore is the net effect on 
transaction costs. For instance, if infant industry protection allows cheaper 
coordination of technology acquisition, the net effect on transaction costs after 
rent-seeking may still be favourable. If so, intervention with rent-seeking may 
have lower overall transaction costs than laissez faire with lower rent-seeking.  
 
Although one-sided, the rent-seeking analysis showed that there may be real 
social costs as a result of contests over property rights. But by concentrating on 
and overstating the costs it ignored the improvements in net benefits which 
changes in institutions (or rights) could bring. The transaction cost framework 
enables this point to be made, although the precise social cost of contests over 
rights in different contexts is still imperfectly understood. In the early models it 
was assumed that the social cost was exactly equal to the size of the rents being 
contested. This was soon shown to be based on assumptions about the political 
institutions governing rent-contestation (Congleton 1980). Two complementary 
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approaches emerged in the NIE literature to preserve the mapping from 
institutions to Type I failures. Both attempts ultimately fail.  
 
The first of the two approaches incorporates the effects of formal political 
institutions. It argues that by looking at the effects of formal economic and 
political institutions jointly we can preserve the mapping from institutions to 
economic outcomes. Examples of such analyses are Congleton (1980), 
Rogerson (1982) and Chang (1994). The problem is that in each case it is easy 
to imagine alternative situations where the results suggested are overturned.  
 
Congleton compares rent-seeking expenditures under majority voting with those 
under a dictatorship. He finds that if legislators in a majority vote setting can be 
cheaply bribed, there is less rent-seeking expenditure than under a dictatorship. 
He points out, however, that if legislators demand high minimum bribes, a 
dictatorship is cheaper (Congleton 1980: 177). Rogerson compares political 
institutions which limit access to rents to a small group with political institutions 
which allow unrestricted access. He finds that limited access might lower rent-
seeking transfers. This result too can be overturned if the excluded have the 
power to heavily contest their exclusion. In Chang (1994) the costs of 
contestation can be reduced if the state is less vulnerable (p. 38-40) and if the 
rent-seeking process is less competitive (p. 41-44). However, as he points out, 
an invulnerable state can sometimes result in large social costs and restricted 
access to rents at one level can simply lead to rent-seeking spilling over to other 
levels. It appears that the costs of contestation cannot be deduced from the 
formal political rules under which the protagonists operate.  
 
The second approach, associated in particular with North (1990 and in this 
book) is to introduce politics through an analysis of informal institutions while 
retaining the analysis of formal political institutions. Informal institutions are the 
norms and conventions which also constrain agents but are not enforceable by 
third parties. They are important for the functioning of formal institutions because 
they determine the intensity of contests and therefore determine how cheaply 
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and effectively existing rights can be enforced. Thus a formal institution (such as 
private property) is likely to have very different consequences if important 
informal norms (such as the commitment to honour contracts) are absent. The 
conclusion is that it is not enough to create the formal institutions which lower 
transaction costs, we also have to create the political conditions which sustain 
the appropriate informal institutions. This argument is very similar to the previous 
one, except now it is a combination of formal and informal institutions which 
determine Type I failure.  
 
In North's (1990) analysis, the best formal economic institutions are well defined 
private property rights. These formal institutions work best with particular informal 
institutions which support trust in (and therefore reduce contests over) private 
property rights. The analysis identifies the best economic institutions and then 
deduces the best informal institutions necessary to support them. For North (Ch. 
2, this volume), the importance of the polity is in ensuring that the required 
informal institutions come into being.  
 
The critical assumption is that the choice of the best formal institutions is 
independent of the polity. If the best formal institutions are indeterminate, so are 
the best supporting informal institutions. For instance, if lifetime employment can 
be the best institution for some contexts, the best cultural norms would be 
appropriately different. If the ranking of formal institutions depended on 
characteristics of the polity, this would undermine the NIE project of attributing 
performance to institutions and require an analysis of the relative performance of 
institutions under well-specified political conditions.  
 
The strongest support for such a critique paradoxically comes from the work of 
institutional economists themselves. North's analysis of institutions is supported 
by a comparison of the British-North American path with the Spanish-Latin 
American one (1990: 112-117). In contrast, the evidence from the East Asian 
NICs has been interpreted by a number of observers as supporting the case for 
intervention particularly for technology acquisition (Wade 1990, Amsden 1989). 
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Using the NIE analysis, Chang (1994) argues that state intervention in South 
Korea reduced transaction costs by enabling the coordination of technology 
acquisition at a lower cost. These analysts thus reverse North's institutional 
ranking by suggesting that attenuated private rights might perform better than 
well-defined ones.  
 
The evidence suggests that the political balance of power conditions both the 
problems institutions have to solve and the costs of solving them in particular 
ways. The Industrial Revolution in Britain and early North American 
industrialization occurred in fairly similar societies. Political power was relatively 
dispersed and technical opportunities required relatively small investments. Well-
defined property rights and the market resulted in growth. These institutions can 
therefore be described as having low transaction costs. In contrast, South Korea 
and Taiwan in the 1960s were societies where political power was effectively 
centralized and both faced the opportunity of catching up by coordinating 
technology acquisition. In these countries centralized coordination proved 
effective and interventionist institutions can be described as having low 
transaction costs. The NIE explanation is misleading because in neither case 
does this describe anything intrinsic to the institution but only its performance in a 
particular context.  
 
Looking at the experiences of less successful countries demonstrates why this is 
critically important. Pakistan in the 1960s, for instance, had an interventionist 
state quite similar in its modernizing motivation to the one in South Korea. It also 
had political exclusion under a military regime. Its economic performance was 
initially promising but not good enough to satisfy all demands and the experiment 
ended with civil war and the dismemberment of the country in 1971. In Pakistan, 
as in many other developing countries, although political power was formally 
centralized, effective political power remained dispersed and was used to 
challenge formal political and economic rights. Here a strategy which required 
the centre to coordinate the interests of political organizations rapidly became 
prohibitively conflictual (Khan 1989).  
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Both rent-seeking analysis and the subsequent transaction cost models are in 
effect correcting implicit assumptions in conventional models regarding the 
social costs of contestation over different sets of rights. However, the net effects 
of an institution depend not just on the institution and the production technologies 
it coordinates but also and critically on the balance of power between the 
classes and groups affected by that institution, that is, on the political settlement. 
North is quite right in pointing out that the informal institutions which can be 
supported in an economy depend on the polity. However the same is true for 
formal institutions. The contestation over particular institutions can vary across 
polities. If so, an institution which is theoretically superior in a model which keeps 
these costs constant may not be superior when we allow for differences in the 
political settlement.  
 
One consequence of recognizing differences in the political settlement is that it is 
possible to explain why performance rankings of institutions in one political 
settlement may not be transportable to another. The related but more serious 
problem is to devise a methodology which will allow us to isolate important 
questions about institutions and to develop analytical models which can address 
the performance of institutions in specific settlements. The NIE methodology 
summarized in Figure 5.2 assumes that it is possible to separate the transaction 
costs associated with an institutional structure into the ‘institution effect’ of each 
institution and a residual ‘political effect’ to be attributed to the political 
settlement. Instead it is more likely that the balance of power determines the net 
benefits particular institutions or structures can deliver by determining the 
contestation costs of maintaining the institution. 
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Figure 5.2 NIE versus political economy methodologies 
 
If so, a more appropriate methodology would be to begin by trying to identify 
important aspects of the political settlement in the country where Type I 
performance is being assessed. Information about the political settlement can 
come from historical and sociological sources. It can also be based on 
comparing institutional performance in the country with others which attempted 
similar institutional changes. If performance differed substantially, this would alert 
us to the relative power of classes or groups adversely affected by the institution 
in the two countries. The alternative methodology is also summarized in Figure 
5.2. Here the analysis of the relative economic effects of institutions is concerned 
with the effects of a specific political settlement on the net social benefits 
associated with alternative institutions.  
 
The implications in terms of policy assessments are quite substantial. 
Comparing Pakistan with South Korea does more than simply point to 
conclusions about the transaction costs associated with particular institutional 
arrangements. Instead a comparative exercise and a reading of history 
facilitates an understanding of differences in the balance of power between the 
groups relevant for each set of institutions across these countries. A comparison 
of industrial policy in Pakistan and South Korea in the 1960s suggests that the 
former had much stronger clientelist linkages between middle and lower-middle 
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class groups and the state. These linkages prevented the Pakistan state from 
making centralized decisions except at a much higher cost in terms of lost net 
benefits compared to South Korea (Khan 1989).  
 
Industrial policy would be ‘responsible’ for Type I failure in Pakistan if it is 
possible to identify alternative institutional arrangements which would imply 
higher net social benefits given the balance of political power in that country in 
the 1960s. The Pakistan variant of industrial policy, like the South Korean one, 
was based on the state deciding the industrial activity of a small number of large 
conglomerates. There are a great number of alternatives which may have 
reduced the costs of contestation emanating from a large, well-organized but 
excluded middle class. For instance, the Taiwanese strategy allowed small 
capitalists to compete vigorously in a relatively free market while technology 
acquisition was organized by the public sector (Whitley 1992 compares the 
sociological differences with the South Korean strategy). This may have 
absorbed many more members of the middle-class into capitalist roles. The role 
of multinationals is also interesting because it may allow a clientelist state to 
prevent contestation in critical areas. The Malaysian strategy of limiting most of 
its clientelism to sectors where important technology decisions were not involved 
is instructive. Other more radical institutional alternatives could also be 
considered. Thus industrial policy may have been responsible for structural 
failure in Pakistan even though it played a dynamic role in South Korea. Why did 
the Pakistan state follow such a strategy? Was it a weak state? These questions 
are addressed in the next section. 
 
 TYPE II STATE FAILURES 
Why should the executive branch of any state not introduce growth-increasing 
rights? After all, even a predatory state could benefit from growth. The failure to 
change institutions to improve social net benefits is Type II state failure or 
transition failure. Explanations of Type II failure can be classified under three 
heads. The first looks at the objectives of the political leadership and in particular 
their time horizon compared to that of society. The second concentrates on 
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errors of calculation and the correctness of the models of the world used by 
agents including the political leadership. The third and potentially most 
interesting approach looks at the costs of change. The NIE contribution here has 
been to model these costs as a variant of transaction costs (as in political 
transaction costs, North 1990). The remainder of this section will concentrate on 
the implications of applying transaction costs to the analysis of change and 
briefly indicate why the other two approaches are of limited interest. 
 
If policy makers desire lower growth than society, this is a failure of political 
representation. Problems emerge when an attempt is made to identify 
systematic reasons why political leaders may not want growth. One explanation 
is in terms of the time horizon of leaders. This is implicit in the revenue-
maximizing state discussed in North (1981). Such a state is not interested in 
introducing output maximizing property rights if this lowers short-run tax 
revenues. Casual observation suggests that predatory leaders do not always 
have short time horizons. Marcos in the Philippines or Ershad in Bangladesh 
behaved till the very end as if they expected to last forever. Moreover, even if 
some predators have high discount rates, is this an exogenous variable? For 
instance, the Kuomintang in China in the 1940s could only be described as 
predatory (Moore 1991: 187-201). The very same Kuomintang in Taiwan in the 
1950s established a developmental state (Wade 1990). It is unlikely that there 
was an exogenous change in the time preference of Chiang Kai Shek and his 
party between these two dates. It is more likely that the behaviour of the KMT in 
China followed from an inability to impose their programme on the population. 
Type II failure has to be explained by something other than the time preferences 
of the leadership.  
 
The problems with the knowledge-based arguments are quite similar. Wrong 
models of the world and imperfect knowledge have been identified as a cause of 
stagnation (North 1990: 8). For instance, policy-makers may have introduced 
tariffs to protect domestic industry but, by taxing their raw material imports as 
well, the net effect may be to disadvantage domestic industry. However, if 
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knowledge was the source of Type II state failure, why does it persist? It would be 
hard to argue that leaders of less successful countries have lagged behind in 
wanting to learn policies and ideologies from more successful countries. Nor is 
there any evidence that they persistently make a greater number of mistakes. But 
less dynamic countries do find it more difficult to correct mistakes once made. 
Failure may have more to do with the costs of changing institutions rather than 
imperfect knowledge or inadequate vision. 
 
Even if there were substantial differences in the models used by leaders, there 
are good methodological reasons for focusing on the costs of change in 
analyzing Type II failure. The relative importance of subjective and objective 
factors in explaining the performance of the state is an old issue in social 
science. In the case of firms which share the same environment, the differences 
in the subjective creativity of entrepreneurs (Schumpeter's entrepreneurial vision) 
may be fairly important in explaining their relative performance. In comparing the 
relative performance of states, the objective differences in their environments are 
likely to be far more substantial. The environment refers not just to technological 
possibilities but also to political settlements. Subjective differences between 
leaders may still be important but may in this case be relatively less important. 
Good analysis should therefore begin by asking how objective factors might 
determine Type II failure. 
 
The third set of explanations focuses on the objective political differences 
between societies. If growth-enhancing institutions do not emerge there must be 
resistance to change. The NIE approach is to model institutional change as a 
series of voluntary contracts. It is therefore exactly analogous to the neoclassical 
model of market exchange. In the latter transaction costs may prevent all the 
gains from trade from being exhausted. In exactly the same way, the costs of 
organizing institutional change may prevent all socially beneficial institutional 
changes from being implemented. Institutional change involves losers, and if it is 
to be freely negotiated, the losers must be compensated. In the NIE literature, the 
compensations are referred to as side-payments (Libecap 1989) or 
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participation bribes (Dow 1993). Political transaction costs are the costs of 
organizing the side-payments which allow institutions to be changed through a 
process of voluntary contracts (North 1990: 49-51). Type II failure is then 
explained by high levels of political transaction costs: 
The efficiency of the political market is the key to this issue. If 
political transaction costs are low and the political actors have 
accurate models to guide them, then efficient property rights will 
result. (North 1990: 52) 
 
The critique of the NIE approach to the costs of change applied in this chapter 
makes two related points: (a) If all institutional changes were voluntarily 
negotiated with compensating side-payments, all Type II failures would be due to 
failures of knowledge alone. The costs of change then become irrelevant as an 
explanation of Type II failure. However, (b) most important institutional changes 
are politically resisted by the losers because compensation is either not offered 
or, if offered, is not accepted. The intensity and extent of resistance is the real 
‘cost of change’ faced by its initiators, namely, the transition cost. This is a cost 
of change but it is not the political transaction cost. The transition cost is the 
political cost faced by initiators of new institutions. It depends on the change 
attempted, the gainers and losers from that change and the balance of power in 
that society. Thus, it can be concluded that the NIE approach does not in fact 
explain Type II failure. It is possible to have Type II success with high political 
transaction costs. It is equally possible to have Type II failure with low political 
transaction costs.  
 
First, it is necessary to establish why political transaction costs are not relevant 
for the transacted institutional changes analyzed by NIE. Suppose voluntary 
contracts were the only available procedure for organizing institutional change. 
Then the only attainable institutions would be those which could be created 
through voluntary negotiations between individuals. If agents had full information 
they would always contract into the best attainable institutions given their costs 
and preferences. Attainable institutions would only be ‘lost’ if the political 
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transaction costs were higher than they need be. Is there any reason why political 
transaction costs should be higher than attainable?  
 
Like ordinary transaction costs, political transaction costs are specific to 
institutions, in this case political institutions. Consequently, individuals could 
contract to create new political institutions to lower political transaction costs if 
they were attainable. With full information, this too should automatically happen 
whenever there are potential gains in net benefits from such a change. For North, 
democratic institutions may not have zero political transaction costs (1990: 51) 
but they are the most favourable institutional structure approximating that 
condition (1990: 109). For others in the NIE tradition, the costs of negotiating can 
be lowered by restricting political access (Rogerson 1982, Chang 1994: 38-40). 
In either case, an explanation has to be found which shows why individuals do 
not negotiate the creation of political institutions with the lowest political 
transaction costs.  
 
It may be that such political changes are blocked by even higher level transaction 
costs (‘constitutional transaction costs’?). These may include the costs of making 
credible commitments of compensation to those disadvantaged by the proposed 
political changes or the costs of monitoring new types of free-riding behaviour 
once the new institutions are created. Either these constitutional transaction 
costs are unavoidable and prohibitive in which case political institutions cannot 
be changed to reduce political transaction costs. In this case we have no Type II 
failure. Or political transaction costs can be lowered. In this case political 
transaction costs are indeed responsible for Type II failure but this should be 
transitory. As soon as agents are informed of the possibility of reducing political 
transaction costs they should freely negotiate the institutional changes which 
would remove the Type II failure.  
 
With full information, the best institutional world attainable through individual 
contracting (apart from transitory blips) can be realised (Dahlman 1979). 
Consequently, political transaction costs can only explain Type II failure during 
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the transitory blips when agents have not caught up with new knowledge. Only 
persistent failures of knowledge can result in political transaction costs being 
persistently higher than necessary. In that case this explanation collapses into the 
lack of information explanation discussed earlier.  
 
But in fact important real world institutional changes are rarely accompanied by 
the compensation of losers. Human history may not be a history of class struggle 
alone but it is certainly not a history of negotiated institutional change. Modelling 
institutional change ‘as if’ it were a negotiated process with compensation allows 
the importation of sophisticated tools developed in the neoclassical analysis of 
market exchanges but makes the analysis seriously deficient. Real world 
institutional change involves path-changes. These are discontinuous breaks in 
the paths that would have been negotiated through compensation. Even relatively 
minor institutional changes such as changes in tax rates are typically not 
negotiated through compensating side-payments. The NIE in contrast is 
‘explaining’ path-dependence which involves negotiated transitions along a 
defined path which may have many branches. 
 
The costs of change become relevant with path changing. The relevant costs of 
change are not the transaction costs of organizing side-payments. By definition, 
if side-payments are not on offer, the cost of organizing them is not relevant. The 
relevant costs of change are what we shall call transition costs. Transition costs 
measure the political costs which potential losers from a proposed institutional 
change can impose on the proponents. Proponents of change can rank 
potential projects in terms of the political opposition they are likely to face. This 
ranking reveals their assessment of the transition costs of projects. The ranking 
may turn out to be wrong and have to be revised over time. But at any given time, 
the transition cost ranking indicates which if any of the projects are politically 
feasible given the tolerance level of the proponents to absorb transition costs. 
 
Unlike political transaction costs which are an economic cost, transition costs 
cannot be measured using an economic numeraire. The political costs they 
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measure are the "costs" inflicted on a specified group by political events such as 
physical violence or defeats in elections. Some of these costs may have an 
economic counterpart in damage to property or losses to production but even 
here what matters is the ranking of composite bundles of costs associated with 
each strategy. One important determinant of the transition costs political 
contenders can inflict on one another is the balance of power described by the 
political settlement. Given the transition cost ranking of each group, the feasibility 
of particular projects depends on the critical level of transition costs the group 
can absorb. The ability to absorb transition costs and change rights in turn 
changes the political settlement since the relative political power of classes 
depends to some extent on their formal economic and political rights.  
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Figure 5.3 Political transaction costs versus transition costs 
 
Although transition costs are not directly related to political transaction costs, 
organizing cooperation within a class or group with similar interests does 
depend on the costs of organizing side-payments. In turn, the ability of the 
contending groups to organize collectively is one factor determining the political 
costs they can impose on others. The relationship between transaction costs and 
transition costs is shown in Figure 5.3.  
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High transition costs for classes proposing growth-enhancing institutional 
changes is shown in the top row in Figure 5.3. Transitions will be slow regardless 
of the political transaction costs of negotiating change. Implicitly the balance of 
power is in favour of groups who would be hurt by the growth strategy proposed. 
Here low political transaction costs may paradoxically allow cheaper 
organization of resistance by the dominant group. The stagnation in the top right 
hand cell may be deeper than in the top left hand cell! This would be the case, for 
instance, if institutional changes proposed by an emergent industrial class are 
being successfully resisted by clientelist groups which stand to lose from these 
changes. In such a context, political arrangements with low costs of negotiating 
collective action (such as an efficient democracy) may help the dominant 
clientelist groups further (Khan 1989).  
 
On the other hand, if the political settlement favours classes who are initiating 
growth-enhancing institutional changes, they will face low transition costs along 
the bottom row in Figure 5.3. Once again, the effects of political transaction 
costs are indeterminate. Low costs of negotiating political transfers may further 
help the already dominant class to coordinate their strategies and to suppress 
political opposition. The emergence of Parliament as a committee of enclosing 
landlords may have played just such a role in seventeenth century England 
(Moore 1991: 19). However, if universal suffrage is the only democratic option, 
an emerging capitalist class may prefer high political transaction costs. With 
more efficient political institutions, they may find it easier to coordinate their own 
actions but they may also have to compensate losers much more. The 
experience of the East Asian NICs and China in the 1980s demonstrates this. 
The Chinese experience also shows that well-defined property rights may not be 
necessary for Type I success. If the initial allocation hindered capitalist 
development, with an appropriate political balance of power, weakly-defined 
rights may simply indicate rapid transition and Type II success. 
 
Type II failure or transition failure can happen for two sorts of reasons. Given the 
political settlement, it may be that some beneficial changes with acceptable 
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transition costs are lost because of problems of knowledge or vision or 
avoidable political transaction costs. These factors result in a failure to negotiate 
improvements which could have been contractually attained. NIE explanations of 
Type II failure address this aspect of the transition problem. A second possible 
reason for Type II failure is that transition costs for a specific class or group 
results in potential institutional changes not being selected. This much more 
important possibility is the one which needs to be seriously addressed.  
 
The identification of Type II failure due to high transition costs could in turn be 
based on a number of comparisons with different political implications. First, it 
should be possible to compare the existing institutional structure with an 
alternative (with lower Type I failure) holding the political settlement constant. 
Type II failure exists if the existing process of institutional change does not lead 
to the emergence of this alternative structure. Second, a comparison might be 
made between the existing political settlement and an alternative (with lower 
Type I failure) holding the existing structure of institutions constant. Type II 
failure follows in this case from the state and the classes associated with existing 
institutions not being able to change the political settlement in the appropriate 
way. Finally, it may be possible to compare existing performance with an 
alternative with different institutions and a different political settlement. Type II 
failure in this case follows from not being able to change both institutions and the 
settlement in appropriate ways. 
 
While it is relatively simple in each case to describe the location of Type II failure, 
by focusing on one location rather than the large number of alternatives, the 
analyst is making a political judgement about the transition which is desirable. 
This is a political judgement because there is no arithmetic to compare 
alternative sets of potential net benefits with transition costs which vary in their 
intensity and incidence and which are ordinal rankings specific to particular 
groups. Nevertheless such judgements have to be made. It is then necessary to 
be explicit about the political values and notions of justice informing the particular 
choices being suggested.  
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Differences in political implications can be seen by referring to the example of 
structural failure in Pakistan in the 1960s. The first type of comparison would 
locate transition failure in the inability of alternative sets of capitalists (small 
capitalists or multinationals for instance) to establish alternative institutions more 
appropriate to the political settlement. The focus here would be on the inability of 
these groups to absorb the transition costs involved or to reduce the ability of 
existing groups to inflict these costs. The policy implication would be to mobilize 
and strengthen these groups for such a contest. Alternatively, a comparison 
could be made between the political settlement in Pakistan and an alternative 
which would allow industrial policy of this type to work. Transition failure here 
would be attributed to the inability of the military regime to change the political 
settlement by absorbing the transition costs involved or reducing them through 
political deals. The Ayub Khan regime in Pakistan did in fact attempt such a 
transition through a process of suppression and selective incorporation of 
clientelist groups. The experiment was abandoned after the uprising of 1969-71 
and a civil war in which possibly a million people died. If the state is still judged to 
have been a ‘weak state’ the subsequent policy implications are clear. Finally, a 
comparison with an alternative set of institutions with a different political 
settlement could result in radical conclusions and the identification of alternative 
political programmes.  
 
The analysis of transition failure is therefore quite separate from the political 
judgements involved in selecting a particular strategy of transition. The great 
danger with the NIE approach is that by ignoring transition costs it presents what 
are essentially transitions as processes which can be managed judiciously by 
states which have the right models or the right ‘vision’ (Chang and Rowthorn 
1993). States, when they are involved in processes of transition, are attempting 
some transitions rather than others. The justification for this must be based on a 
politics which should be made explicit. Moreover, transitions which had low 
transition costs in one context may not in another. The difference between South 
Korea and Pakistan had little to do with the quality of their leaders and their 
 22 
conflict management skills. The real difference was in the balance of power in 
these societies in the 1960s. A political assessment of the transition costs which 
were inflicted by the Pakistan experiment of the 1960s suggests that other 
strategies of transition must have been preferable even if Pakistan had 
managed as a result to achieve the South Korean rate of growth. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the NIE is to analyze the economic implications of institutions and to 
suggest policy. It has been argued that a mapping from institutions to economic 
performance cannot be sustained either theoretically or with reference to history. 
This conclusion holds even if the institutional specification includes political and 
informal institutions. An analysis of the political settlement is required for 
assessing the contribution of specific institutions to Type I failure. It is even 
possible for the ranking of institutions in terms of their economic performance to 
be reversed under different political settlements. The alternative research 
methodology suggested is to analyse the implications of institutional structures 
under specified political settlements.  
 
The analysis of transition or Type II failure is even more seriously affected by the 
absence of a political analysis. The NIE analysis is either correct and trivial or 
incorrect and misleading. It would be correct if real world institutional changes 
were voluntarily negotiated between contracting parties. It would nevertheless be 
trivial because in such a world all transition failures would be due to information 
lags. In fact, institutional change does not involve compensation and the NIE 
analysis turns out to be seriously misleading. The relevant cost of institutional 
change is a political cost, the transition cost. The transition cost is closely 
dependent on the political settlement. Transitions which were possible with low 
transition costs in one context may be unacceptably costly in another. But this is 
not all. To select between strategies which have different intensities and 
distributions of transition costs requires a political judgement about the 
acceptable incidence of transition costs. Finally, it is worth remembering that a 
‘mistake’ in the assessment of the transition costs involved in implementing 
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particular programmes of institutional change can ultimately result in civil war and 
large scale loss of lives. The false sense of objectivity in the NIE analysis could 
not be more serious. 
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